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In law, we commonly presume that judges reach decisionsbased on legal materials, such as precedents.  In political sci-ence, researchers typically presume that judges do not reach
decisions based on such legal materials.  They maintain that the
apparent reliance on precedent to reach decisions is simply a
hoax designed to provide cover for a particular outcome.  These
researchers traditionally argued that judges reach their person-
ally preferred outcome in the case and then rationalize it after the
fact with references to precedent, conveniently supplied them by
the attorneys for their preferred side.
Much of the empirical research on judicial decision making
has involved the United States Supreme Court.  Indeed, there is
considerable evidence that Supreme Court justices decide cases
differently, for ideological reasons, and do not reliably defer to
prior precedents of the Court.  For structural reasons, though,
the Supreme Court is not a representative sample to study the
operation of the law.  The Court selects its own cases, and very
few of them.  These are often the cases where the law does not
provide a clear answer, so one cannot look for legal control.
Moreover, in its position at the top of the judicial hierarchy, the
Supreme Court has no vertically superior precedents it is legally
bound to obey.
The lower courts are where the law is found in this nation.
They issue vastly more decisions and the appellate courts are
often the final arbiters of legal disputes, on the frequent occa-
sions when the Supreme Court does not review their rulings.
Political scientists and economists have considered the role of
precedent in lower courts.  Although loath to accept claims that
judges follow precedent because they are supposed to do so,
these researchers have argued that lower-court judges do indeed
follow precedent, for strategic reasons.  
STRATEGY THEORY OF PRECEDENT FOLLOWING
The basic premise of the strategic theory of following prece-
dents is that lower-court judges do not reach their preferred out-
comes in cases because of a fear of reversal by a higher court.
They compromise their ideological preferences to avoid a rever-
sal, which would of course undo those preferences.  In addition,
researchers hypothesize that there is some stigma associated with
reversal such that judges will shun results that subject them to
higher-court reversal.
At the federal-circuit-court level, this hypothesis has facial
plausibility problems.  The federal circuit courts decide tens of
thousands of cases annually, while the Supreme Court now
reviews fewer than one hundred cases.  If judges are so devoted
to their ideological preferences, it makes little sense for them to
sacrifice those preferences across the board, when the probabil-
ity of reversal is so extremely low.
The experience of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals illus-
trates this effect.  In 1997, the Supreme Court took 29 cases from
the Ninth Circuit and reversed 96% of them, which probably
represents a record for the disciplining of a particular circuit
court.  Yet the Ninth Circuit decided around eight thousand
cases a year, and the Supreme Court let stand 99.7% of the cir-
cuit’s 1997 decisions.  Thus, the circuit had little incentive to
modify its decisions to avoid reversal and in fact it did not do so.
The Ninth Circuit continued to have a high reversal rate at the
Court, typically rendering relatively liberal decisions, a few of
which were reversed but most of which stood unreviewed.
Researchers have come up with some clever theories of ran-
dom auditing that enable the Supreme Court to have influence
beyond the few cases it takes.  But none of these theories enable
a Court deciding so few cases to exercise control over the vast
body of circuit court decision making.  Moreover, these strategic
theories do not truly explain adherence to precedent – they try
to explain adherence to contemporaneous Supreme Court pref-
erences.  Under the theories, there is little reason for a circuit
court to follow a Warren Court precedent, when such an out-
come may not be favored by the present makeup of the Supreme
Court.
This adherence to current Supreme Court preferences is
sometimes called “anticipatory overruling.”  This occurs when a
lower court believes that the Supreme Court wishes to disregard
a past precedent of the Court, and the lower court therefore dis-
regards that precedent in expectation of affirmance.  An oft-cited
instance of this action is the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood
v. Texas, which essentially concluded that the Bakke decision on
affirmative action was no longer the Supreme Court’s preference.
While one can identify instances of apparent anticipatory over-
ruling, they do not seem frequent.  And anticipatory overruling
is not adherence to precedent.
ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF PRECEDENT FOLLOWING
The conventional legal theory of precedent following is one of
traditional Langdellian formalism.  Judges decide cases accord-
ing to the best application of precedents (and other legal sources
such as the Constitution and statutes) to the facts at hand.  This
traditional theory turns judges into ciphers, acting as “law calcu-
lators” to decide cases without individuality personality or pref-
erences.  Few scholars in the law or other disciplines believe that
judges act in this manner.  Indeed, few judges claim to act in this
manner. There is ample empirical evidence showing that differ-
ent judges will reach different decisions in the same case and that
this difference can be explained by their apparent ideological
preferences.  However, the empirical evidence falls far short of
demonstrating that individual judicial ideology explains all or
even most decisions.  The following theory attempts to salvage a
kernel of the conventional formalistic theory of judicial decision
making, and combine it with judicial ideology.
I begin by suggesting that judges have a preference for fol-
lowing the law.  In the language of an economist, judges get util-
ity from adhering to precedent, perhaps because it is considered
part of their judicial responsibility.  This is not to suggest that
judges are either saints or machines who slavishly follow their
duty at the expense of all personal predilections.  Rather, I sug-
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gest only that judges take law adherence seriously enough that
it forms part of their decision-making consideration.  Richard
Posner has suggested an interesting analogy of judging to play-
ing a game.  Legal decision making is a rule.  Just as a chess
player would get little utility from winning a match by cheating
on the rules, Posner suggests that a judge would get little utility
from reaching a desired outcome by cheating on the law.  For
my purposes, it is unimportant to identify the reason that judges
prefer law or precedent adherence, simply that they do have this
preference.
At this point, it is necessary to turn to what it means to fol-
low precedent, which requires a digression into linguistic theory.
Those who believe that the law is all political, such as critical
legal theorists, argue simply that language is too ambiguous to
constrain judges.  In the hands of a skilled interpreter, words
can be colorably twisted to mean anything.  The “Crits” argued
that language was radically indeterminate, so that any word
could be manipulated to mean anything.  This theory of radical
indeterminacy has been generally rejected as implausible, but
that does not deny the presence of some indeterminacy in lan-
guage.
Philosophers have devoted much time to exploring the study
of language, commonly called hermeneutics.  Gadamer is per-
haps the leading philosopher in the field and he emphasized the
inevitable indeterminacy of language.  He stressed that the inter-
pretation of a given text is influenced by the interpreter and his
or her own history and context.  However, he also noted that
there were interpretive communities of individuals with roughly
similar histories and contexts who would interpret the same lan-
guage with great commonality.  This latter position suggests that
the judiciary might be expected to reach similar interpretations
of the same precedent.
There remains the problem of some linguistic indeterminacy,
however.  A common American interpretive community would
not look at the color red and declare it to be blue.  Words about
colors are not so radically indeterminate.  However, consider
when that community is presented with a color such as aqua-
marine or some other intermediate shade.  Some interpreters
might call this color blue, while others would disagree.  The
word for the color blue thus has some determinacy and rules out
various shades but is not perfectly determinate, defining all the
same shades into the set for every individual.  Language has an
unavoidable fuzziness.  
Precedents share this fuzziness of meaning.  The words of the
precedent have their own uncertain meaning, especially when
composed of very broad terms such as “due process.”  Moreover,
the precedential case was resolved in a particular dispute with
particular underlying facts.  While it may discuss the impor-
tance of various facts to its ruling, the precedent cannot possi-
bly discuss the relevance of every conceivable fact that might
subsequently arise.  In a later case, with different facts, a judge
might reasonably find that the earlier precedent should be dis-
tinguished, given the factual differences.  
To better understand this fuzziness, one can turn to the sci-
ence of categorical perception.  Much of this science has exam-
ined the perception of sounds.  For example, the sounds for the
letters “b” and “p” are distinct but have an intermediary contin-
uum.  A sound can depart from the “ideal b” sound and still be
perceived as a “b.”  At some point, though, the departure
becomes too great, and the sound is no longer perceived as a “b”
but perhaps instead as a “p.”  This produces an association that
studies of categorical speech perception have characterized as
“S-shaped.”  This association is depicted below in Figure 1.  The
analogy to precedent is straightforward.  The precedent sets an
ideal point for future decisions, but a court may depart some-
what from that ideal point and still be perceived as consistent
with precedent.  However, once the departure from the ideal
point becomes too great, it is no longer perceived as consistent
with adherence to precedent.  The implications of this associa-
tion are depicted in the following three figures.
To begin my depiction of the theory of precedent-following,
the relevant considerations must be reduced to some quantita-
tive scale, which seems somewhat artificial.  However, it is not
important that the precise quantification be accurate, so long as
the relationships are roughly accurate.  Figure 1 is meant to
depict the nature of language interpretation as an S-shaped
curve.  Suppose the best understanding or intended meaning of
a precedent is at the far right end of the figure, at the point
labeled 20.  The horizontal axis is a measure of the distance of a
decision from this point 20 and the vertical axis is a measure of
how linguistically clear it is that the decision is in fact distant
from point 20.
S-CURVE OF LANGUAGE AND PRECEDENT
In this figure, a decision at point 20 is perfectly compliant
with precedent, but its linguistic fuzziness means that a decision
at point 15 appears to be quite compliant with precedent.
However, once one gets much further removed from point 20,
the noncompliance with precedent becomes quite clear.  At
points 5 or 10, it is relatively obvious to the decider that he or
she is departing from precedent.  If a judge perceives that the
intended point of precedent is at 20, he or she would render an
opinion based on this perception, and this would represent a
classic legal formalism.  However, given the fuzziness of lan-
guage, a judge might misperceive the precise location of prece-
dent and believe that it was set at point 15. 
Next I consider the problem that arises when a judge does
not like the outcome dictated by precedent – the issue of inter-
est to researchers of judicial decision making.  If a judge ideo-
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logically agrees with the precedent, one would expect the judge
to happily follow it, but this does not display any power of
precedent, because the judge would have reached that decision
absent precedent.  For adherence to precedent to have meaning,
it must influence decisions away from those the judge would
otherwise prefer to reach.
Figure 2 displays the conflict.  Again, we have a precedent set
at point 20 but now the deciding judge’s ideology lies at point
0, some distance from the precedent.  I assume that the more
ideologically distant the decision is from the judge’s ideology,
the less preferred it is.  This is depicted by the straight line in
Figure 2, which steadily declines as it gets further from 0.  This
is superimposed on the S-shaped curve of precedent following
in Figure 1.
IDEOLOGY IN CONFLICT WITH PRECEDENT
Note that for purposes of this figure, I have assumed that ide-
ology is more important to the judge than is legal-precedent fol-
lowing.  The ideological line peaks at point 60, while precedent
following gets no higher than point 50.  Thus, if given the
choice, the judge would prefer to decide ideologically at point 0
than legally at point 20, because 60 > 50.
However, this outcome does not follow if one assumes that a
judge gets utility from both ideology and law adherence.  Thus,
at each point on our distance scale, the judge gets the vertical
ideology measure for consistency with ideology and the vertical
legal measure for consistency with the law and precedent.
Figure 3 displays the results from adding the two measures
together from Figure 2.  The horizontal axis is again a measure
of distance (from precedent and preferred ideology), and the ver-
tical axis is a measure of judicial utility from adding up the legal
and ideological measures.
CUMULATIVE IDEOLOGICAL/LEGAL UTILITY
Based on my assumptions, the lower-court judge gains the
greatest cumulative ideological/legal utility by deciding the case
at around point 15.  This provides “pretty good” adherence to
precedent (at point 20), allowing some influence from the judge’s
personal ideological preferences.  This pretty good adherence to
precedent occurs even though the individual judge in my hypo-
thetical model places greater relative importance on ideology
than adherence to precedent.
In this theory, the closeness of future adherence to precedent
may depend on the specificity of that precedent.  My S-shaped
curve may have different dimensions, with a larger or smaller
upper plateau, depending on the clarity of the precedential com-
mand.  Some precedents, which provide more detailed speci-
ficity, may have a smaller upper plateau of linguistic indetermi-
nacy, and they should therefore command a greater degree of
adherence from lower courts.  However, the effort to produce too
much precision could result in inflexible rules that will be disre-
garded or too easily distinguished away in future decisions.
The judicial ideological influence need not be a conscious
one.  Psychologists have consistently identified a feature of
human nature called motivated reasoning.  In this process, indi-
viduals analyze available information conditioned on their
beliefs.  They are more likely to believe information that would
support their desired conclusion and disbelieve information
inconsistent with that result.  Although a judge may be dedicated
to producing an opinion that would convince even a dispassion-
ate observer, the factual and legal sources of a decision are fil-
tered through the judge’s preexisting preferences, which influ-
ence the outcome.
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CIRCUIT-COURT DECISIONS
I believe my hypothesis, that judges gain utility from both
ideologically consistent decisions and from law adherence is a
plausible one, and it is supported by various surveys of circuit-
court judges that have been conducted over the years.  Like any
hypothesis, though, it must be tested for predictive accuracy.
Such empirical testing of judicial decision making is imprecise.
In contrast to traditional economics, with readily available quan-
titative measures for GDP and other variables, there are no obvi-
ous quantifications for ideology or adherence to precedent.
Most empirical research on judicial decision making has been
conducted by political scientists and focused on the role of ide-
ology in decisions, so I use their basic frame and available data.
As noted above, the Supreme Court has been extensively studied
and justices have been given quantifiable scores for ideology, and
research has shown that their decisions conform reasonably well
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to those ideological scores.  Thus, we have reasonably reliable
measures of Court ideological preferences.  To provide ideologi-
cal measures for circuit court judges, I assume that their prefer-
ences conform to those of their appointing President (as mea-
sured by their ADA ratings).  These provide us with measures of
ideological preference for the judges.
Providing ideological measures for decisions is even more dif-
ficult.  There are no grounds for saying that a particular opinion
is located at a particular ideological point on our scale (0-20 in
the figures).  Researchers typically classify these decisions on a
binary scale, as either liberal or conservative and have developed
rules for this classification.  For example, if a decision strikes
down an anti-abortion law as unconstitutional, it would be
coded as liberal while if it upholds that law it would be coded as
conservative.  Obviously, the available measures for judicial ide-
ology and decision ideology are only very rough ones.  This
imprecise specification, though, generally has the statistical
effect of obscuring a true association.  If an association appears,
despite the limitations of the measures, that provides especially
strong evidence of its reliability.
To conduct the study, I use the already accepted measures of
ideology for the Supreme Court and for circuit court judges.  I
study decisions using a vast database of thousands of federal cir-
cuit court decisions over the years, compiled thanks to a
National Science Foundation grant.  This database codes the
decisions on numerous dimensions, including whether they
reach a liberal or conservative outcome.  
My study considers the likelihood that a given judge will issue
a liberal (or conservative) decision.  I have three essential vari-
ables to test.  The first variable is judicial ideology, measured by
the presidential appointment ADA rating discussed above.  If
this variable is statistically significant, it would show that judi-
cial ideology matters.  The second variable is the contemporane-
ous ideological position of the median Supreme Court justice.
This is the “swing voter” on the Court, whose preferences are
likely to dictate the outcome of close cases.  If this variable is sta-
tistically significant, it would provide some evidence of anticipa-
tory overruling, that circuit judges are strategically adapting their
decision to the contemporaneous preferences of the Court.
However, the contemporaneous preferences of the Court may
also reflect the past preferences of the Courts, and hence the con-
tent of their decisions and precedents issues.  If so, the associa-
tion might truly reveal adherence to precedent.  To control for
this effect, I add a third variable for the Supreme Court’s median
voter for the prior five years, to reflect the ideological content of
recent precedents.  If this variable is significant, after controlling
for the preferences of the contemporaneous Court, it would sug-
gest that precedent is indeed driving the outcome of circuit court
decisions.
I used a procedure known as logistic regression to test the
effect of these variables on decisions.  There are 20,744 separate
votes by circuit court judges in the database, for which all the
necessary variable measurements are available.  Because some of
these cases have relatively little ideological content, I also ran the
regression for two subsets of cases.  One subset is criminal cases,
where a vote for the defendant is considered liberal, for which
there were 7,206 judicial votes to be studied.  The second sub-
set is civil-rights cases, where a vote for the party representing a
minority is considered liberal, for which there were 2,419 judi-
cial votes to be considered.  Table 1 reports the results of the
regression for each set of cases.  
All results were highly statistically significant at the .01 level,
for each group of cases.  The significant finding was that Ideology
and Past Supreme Court Median were positive, but the current
Supreme Court Median was actually negative.  This is strong evi-
dence against the anticipatory overruling theory but supports the
theses that both judicial ideology and precedent are important
determinants of the votes of circuit court judges.  In a logit
regression the size of the number (the coefficient) cannot be
directly compared among variables, which also have different
scales.  Thus, the statistical significance of the findings does not
demonstrate the substantive significance of the effect of each of
these variables.  
The substantive significance of our variables can be measured
in a different approach.  For this, I considered the effect of mov-
ing from the 25th percentile on each scale to the 75th percentile.
For example, with Ideology, I considered the effect on decisions
of moving from the 25th percentile (a relatively conservative
judge) to the 75th percentile (a relatively liberal judge).  Table 2
displays the effect of this change on the overall votes in the
model.
These results mean that a shift from a relatively conservative
judge to a relatively liberal judge means that the judge’s vote will
be 6.9% more likely to be a liberal one.  Both ideology and
precedent show an effect.  This also enables some comparison of
effects and indicate that precedent is slightly more significant.
The effect sizes are not that great, but this is to be expected,
because the case facts are important and cannot be incorporated
in the model.  In addition, the sizes may be moderated by the
inability to provide precise specifications for the variables of ide-
ology and precedent.  I suspect that this problem causes a par-
TABLE 1: 
LOGIT REGRESSION ON 
OUTCOME OF CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
ALL CASES CRIMINAL CASES CIVIL-RIGHTS CASES
IDEOLOGY .05 .05 .07
SUPREME COURT
MEDIAN -.50 -.46 -2.0
PAST SUPREME





SUPREME COURT MEDIAN -5.7%
PAST SUPREME COURT MEDIAN 7.4%
ticular understatement of the precedent variable (because it con-
siders only recent Supreme Court decisions and does not con-
sider other precedents, such as those of the circuit court itself).
Moreover, it does not consider other legal factors, such as
statutes.
CONCLUSION
Judging, like any human decision making, is a complex
process.  The efforts of researchers to reduce this process to
models is necessarily simplifying and fails to capture the full
scope of the decision-making process.   However, those models
can illuminate key aspects of the process.  There is neither
sound theoretical reason nor empirical evidence to support con-
tentions that judges engage in much strategic anticipatory over-
ruling.  Instead, it appears that judges generally adhere to prece-
dent, albeit with some differences depending upon their per-
sonal ideological preferences.  The results are consistent with
my hypothesis about the S-shaped curve of adherence to prece-
dent in judicial decision making.  The law and precedent do not
rigidly bind subsequent judicial decisions, but they do tether
them.  Judicial discretion, an inevitable consequence of some
linguistic indeterminacy, enables small departures from govern-
ing precedent, but dramatic disregard of precedent appears to be
rare.
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